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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------
---------------,-------------------
NOR.c'IA E. GREEN, and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of 
social Services, 
Case No. 14610 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v-
CRAIG E. GREEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~1ENT OF 7h'E :lATURE OF THE CASE 
~;~~::-:~~s asked the Court in an Order to Show 
Cause f.:;.:- 2. j u:'.:;:cent on unpaid child support in the amount of 
One thousand, One hundred seventy-seven and 44/100 dollars 
($1,177.44) based on the premise that the Order of the Court 
entered the 24th day of January, 1974 relieving the respondent 
of his support obligation was void and that the obligation of 
support was in effect for the entire period of time since the 
order, not withstanding the order itself. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After the lower court ruled against appellants and 
then vacated its order on a motion for reconsideration, it ruled 
that the order entered in 1974 was valid and should be reinstated. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request this court to reverse the final 
order of the court sustaining the 1974 order and directing 
the lower court to make a determination as to the amount of 
support owed under appellant's order to show cause and directing 
the court to enter judgment in favor of the state for the 
amount determined to be owing. 
STATENEHT OF FACTS 
Co-plaintiff Norma Green and the defendant Craig 
Green wer= divorced the 15th day of November 1972 (R-17 ,18). 
There w=.s one :-': :'..ld of the marriage, I!ichael Brandon Green. 
Purs ua:-:-: -:o t:-.e ::=cree, the de fen dan t was ordered to pay $75.00 
per mor:-::.:.-: sup_?;::-: for the chile. As the record reflects, the 
defendan~ was no~ faithful in meeting his obligations and 
judgments were entered against him. (R. 27, R. 47) 
The parties then entered into a stipulation relieving 
the defendant of all obligation of support and relieving him 
of all parental rights upon the signing of the consent to 
adoption. There is no dispute as to whether the defendant 
signed the agreement. The fact is, however, that the co-plaintiff 
has never remarried, and the child has never been adopted, and 
that the order was based on the supposition that "II. The 
plaintiff intends to remarry. (R. 52) 
As per Exhibit "B" of the State of Utah with its 
order to show cause (R. 74) the child has been on public Assis-
tance since the order referred to above. The court dismissed ~e 
-2-
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state's Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the court had 
previously relieved the defendant of all parental rights and 
duties of sup port. ( R. 82) . 
Counsel for the State noticed up a motion for Re-
consideration based on the Utah Case of Riding vs. Riding 
8 Utah 2d 136, 329 P. 2d 878 (1958) (R. 84). That matter came 
on for hearing on the 9th of April 1976 at which time the 
Court vacated its prior Order and continued the matter in order 
to have the co-plaintiff appear to discuss the situation (R. 87). 
That mac:::er came on for hearing the 7th day of Hay, 1976 at which 
time the Cour'= again reversed itself and reinstated the prior 
Orderdec~~d Fe::Or:.:a:::y 2_3, 1976 (P.. 92) which terminated the defen-
_:;s c. :::est.:l t of the Courts see-saw approach in light 
of the precedure of Riding, id., the appellants feel compelled 
to appeal for the sake of the child and for the support due and 
owing until the child turns 21 as ordered by the divorce decree. 
(R.l8). 
ARGUHENT 
----
POINT I 
A FATHER HAS A STATUTORY AND C0!-1HON LAh' OBLIGATION 
TO SUPPORT HIS CHILD AND MAINTAIN PARENTAL RIGHTS 
INCIDENT THERETO 
The laws of the State of Utah, whether by Statute 
or by case point out the great concern of the courts over 
parenthood of children. Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 states: 
-3-
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"Every Man shall support his wife and his child." 
Child, as defined by that chapter is a "son or daughter under 
the age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living without sufficient 
means." (U.C.A. 78-45-2 {4) 
This court has also spoken on this subject in Jenkins 
vs. Jenkins 107 Utah 261, 153 P. 2d 262 where the court said 
a father has a positive duty to support his minor child. Further, 
in Rees vs. Archibald 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P. 2d 788 (1957) this 
court e~?hasized: 
"'i'his court has invariably emphasized 
~he =~~er's obligation to support his child-
~en ~~se= upon the elenentary principle that 
~e leN inposes upon those who bring children 
in':o tl::e ·..;orld the c·.::.'::y to care for and support 
':he:n ::ic:ri::.g their minority and dependency." 
(Er:-.pha.si3 acded.) 
These cases have been the standard which Utah courts have been 
required to follow. It seems only logical, that with such case 
law and statutory language, two people, as in this case, cannot 
stipulate away that right to parenthood which the child has. 
In fact, this court held in Utah Fuel Company vs. 
Industrial Commission 83 Utah 166, 27 P. 2d 434 (1933) that a 
child cannot waive its support. Further, through Lopes vs. Lopes 
30 Utah 2d 393 (1974 ) this court won't even allow 
testimony by parents to "bastardize" children because they are 
taking away from children a solid right they have. Thus, if this 
court won • t allow children to be voluntarily bastardized through 
· · that the acts of the "parents" and if this court takes the pos1 tlon 
-4-
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children cannot give up that right, it would be totally 
inconsistent for this court to hold, as the lower court did, 
that the child is forever severed from his parental affection 
and relationship simply because the parents want to so 
stipulate presently. Under the lower court order, the child 
is fatherless simply because the mother had "intended to get 
married' and yet never did. 
There are only two possibilities, known to the 
appella~-::s where parental rights may be severed. Neither 
of those -::1vo procedures were followed in this case. The first 
is by h:: -~ns a:-, actual adoption take place. The second is 
throug:-_ -'";:o:c:.-:::~ion hearings in the juvenile court. Any other 
attempt -:::: s-=-, -.:- the rights, as in this case, is VOID under 
the la,,- :=.nO. s:-:c .1ld so be decla:::-ed. Each of the foregoing 
situations is discussed in the following arguments. 
POINT II 
ONLY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE ADOPTION ORDER AS 
PRESCRIBED IN THE ADOPTION LAW ARE THE PARENTAL 
RIGHTS TERHINATED 
The lower court entered the order in this case 
that upon signing a "consent to adoption" the parental res-
ponsibilities, liabilities, and privileges were terminated 
from that time onward. What makes this matter even more 
repulsive is the fact that the order described above was 
done by written stipulation based on the premise that the 
plaintiff "intends to remarry." Such is void because no 
-5-
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adoption has taken place, no marriage has been entered by 
plaintiff and the poor child suffers bizzare consequences of 
the stipulation as being a "nobody's child". 
This issue should easily be put to rest based on 
this Court's position in Riding vs. Riding, supra. Basically 
the same facts apply with a few minor changes. In Riding, id. 
the ex-wife remarried and the second husband entered into an 
agreement with the first husband to adopt the child and 
relieve t~e first husband of his obligations to the minor chiN. 
This was later incorporated into a court order so relieving the 
first h~-=:u:d o: his rights and obligations. Thereafter the 
second ~-~ja~~ :3iled to instigate adoption proceedings and t~ 
ex-wife :::..::~-:'. ~:... first husba!"!c! for child support after she 
divorce~ the second husband. Ttis court said relative to that 
Order: 
"If the judgment entered on January 5, 1950, 
be construed as a final and unconditional judgment 
relieving defendant from any and all further obliga-
tion to support Robert Jay Riding then the same 
was and is absolutely void. There is not vested 
in any court of this state the right to make a 
final order relieving a father, permanently, 
of his obligation to support his child except 
under the Adoption Statute." (Emphasis added) 
Further, the court continued: 
" He are of the opinion that the order 
signed by Judge Ellett and filed in the divorce 
action was a conditional order. It recites 
that it is "based upon stipulation filed herein." 
The stipulation contemplated the adoption by 
Glen Offret of Robert Jay Riding. The stipu-
lation recited that Offret consented to adopt 
the child and acknowledged "his desire and 
willingness to maintain the relationship of 
-6-
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parent and child and to support and maintain 
said minor child and to provide it with all 
~hose rights and privileges ordinarily existing 
ln such relationship." 
However, there was no compliance with the 
adoJ?tion statute. He must interpret the order 
a~ 1ntended to go into effect after the adop-
tlon had been complete, which condition never 
occurred." (Emphasis added) 
The court then cited Price vs. Price 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P.2d 
1044 (1955) as follows: 
" Future child support effectively cannot 
be the subject of bargain and sale. Among 
other things, the State is an interested party 
in such natters since a child's welfare is at 
stake * * *. 11 
At this. ~~e order relieving parental obligations was voided, 
the or-__ ~ tc S':c-..; Cac:se rei:r..stated, a:1d the matter remanded 
to the :::s-:ri.c':: :::curt. 
-=:-':is :::c=':: e:nphasizeC. l'tah Code Annotated 78-30-11 
Hhich sta-:.es that: 
"The natural parents of an adopted child 
are, from the time of the adoption relieved of 
all parental duties toward and all responsibility 
for the child so adopted, and shall have no further 
rights over it." 
In the instant case, the woman has never remarried, 
and may never remarry. This would leave the child in limbo, 
not able to collect benefits from Social Security, inheritance, 
etc., not to mention the total cutting off of the parental 
relationship. The fact that the plaintiff " intended to marry" 
isn't conclusive, for ever after a remarriage, the new husband 
must wait one year before an adoption can take place pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-14 (4}. In any event there is a one 
-7-
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year period of "bastardization" even if the adoption goes through, 
The 1-lashington Supreme Court in Gaidos vs. Gaidos 293 
P. 2d 388, (Wash, 1956) carne to the same conclusion as this court. 
Though the major portion of the opinion was directed in a 
different path, the court said: 
"The fact that the stepfather is able and 
willing to contribute to their support does 
not relieve the father of his responsibility, 
which continues until such time as they are 
adopted, reach majority, or are otherwise 
ernailClpated . " (Emphasis Added) 
Thus we see that no adoption has taken place in this case. There 
hasn't even been a remarriage. In fact, there has been no 
mention o:' ado?~::.or: except in the original stipulation. Appellants 
contend, ~~at becaase of the facts and the law as here cited, 
Judge C:co:::t's r1..:::.i::-:.; sustaining t..he lmver court's prior order 
should be reve::-5ed with the prio:c order being set aside as being 
VOID from its inception. 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE COURT ACT FOR 
THE TER-MINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS lvAS NOT 
FOLLOWED AND THEREFORE THE ORDER IS VOID 
The only other provision of the law which appellants 
know of to terminate parental rights is found in Utah Code 
Ailnotated 55-10-109. Under this section the legislature has 
spelled out the grounds for such determination. These are (a) 
incompetence or unfitness of parents, (b) abandonment by parents 
of child, {c) refusal to give child proper parental care over a 
protective period, (d) upon voluntary petition of the parent(s) 
-8-
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if the court finds it in the best interest of the child. 
The record is void of any of the foregoing. There 
has never been such an action filed in Juvenile Court. Even 
if there had been an action filed there, the law requires an 
in depth analysis of the facts before the court is permitted 
to terminate the rights. 
This court should take notice that the statutory 
procedure was not followed and therefore, no termination of 
rights has taken place in accordance to law. 
CONCLUSION 
_:1·2 ·nc=.:_ :are of children is of utmost importance to 
our soc~ _ ~llow stipula~ed court orders to terminate 
parenc~:.. ::~c;:·;::; ..!?On the whio and feelings of parents is not 
only an ~~use o~ discresion but also a tragedy in our society. 
The plaintiff "intended to marry," whatever that means, but 
in fact didn't. Utah law requires a father to support his 
children, stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the order of 
the lower court and remand this matter for a hearing to 
determine the arrearage accrued since the entry of the 
stipulation. 
Respectfully submitted: 
VERNON B. ROHNEY 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCWIYENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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